- Freeman, M., and C. Anderson. Forthcoming. Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting. Environmental and Resource Economics.
- Scheld, A., C. Anderson and H. Uchida. 2012. The Economic Effects of Catch Share Management: The Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot Program. Marine Resource Economics 27(3):203-228.
- Anderson, C. 2010. An Experimental Analysis of a Points-based System for Managing Multispecies Fisheries. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 39(2):227-44.
- Anderson, C.M. and L. Putterman. 2006. Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior 54(1):1-24. (Lead article).
- Anderson, C., and D. Holland. 2006. Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement. Land Economics 82(3):333-52.
- Anderson, C.M. and J.G. Sutinen. 2006. The Effect of Initial Lease Periods on Price Discovery in Laboratory Tradable Fishing Allowance Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61(2):164-180.
Prospective graduate students may contact this faculty member for availability as an advisor.
The position of Fisheries Economist is a new one in SAFS, and acknowledges the increasing role that economics is playing in developing effective management for aquatic and fishery resources. Policy-interested biologists and ecologists are increasingly working through management measures that are incentive-based, rather than command-and-control. Identifying and achieving management goals for complex human-natural systems demands appreciating how people will respond to changes in management and in their environment, questions economic tools are designed to address. I participate directly in management through membership on the Scientific and Statistical Committee of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.
I became an economist because I am broadly curious about decision making in environments that induce strategic behavior that leads to bad individual or aggregate outcomes. I see economics as a behavioral science, and I am especially interested in cases where systematically suboptimal individual decisions exacerbate bad outcomes, or can be leveraged to ameliorate them. I rely especially on game theory, behavioral economics, experimental economics and maximum-likelihood panel and latent class econometrics to build and test models.
While my work spans a wide range of applications, fisheries and coastal issues emerge as consistent themes. My recent work is dominated by questions related to the design of fishery management institutions, especially those based on individual or community rights systems. I am interested in how to design these schemes for different objectives and environments, how people behave within them, and how they will evolve over time.